

EMPATHY VS. EVIDENCE IN RHETORICAL SPEECH:  
CONTRASTIVE CULTURAL STUDIES IN 'EMPATHY' AS FRAMEWORK  
OF SPEECH COMMUNICATION AND ITS TRADITION IN CULTURAL  
HISTORY

[Retorik Konuşmada Empatiye Karşı Kanıt: Sesli İletişimin Çerçevesi  
Olarak 'Empati' Ve Onun Kültürel Tarihteki Geleneği Üzerine  
Karşılaştırmalı Kültürel Çalışmalar]

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Dr. Fee-Alexandra Haase

[F.A.Haase@gmx.de](mailto:F.A.Haase@gmx.de)

Am Sportplatz 2 D-18573 Ramin Germany

**ABSTRACT**

When a term is used in science, we tend to integrate its origins, functions, and history to see if the term is a scientific one or comes from other fields. The term «empathy» is an example to such a case. This article challenges the widespread view that empathy is the capability of a person to understand emotions and thoughts of others. We will deconstruct the concept of empathy as an academic one by focusing on its limits. We will discuss the possibility of empathy for humans in critically reconstructing the meaning of the word and its meanings from its ancient origins to contemporary research. Our question is centered on cognitive actions that enable empathy as an emotional way of understanding others. Based on our findings, we argue that the concept of empathy is a recently established academic term. As a concept, it matches with some alternative concepts such as *apathy* and *sympathy*. In rhetoric, it is the *pathos* of the speech that affects the speaker by emotions since no specific receptive ability of the speaker is needed. Similarly, when we use the term empathy, we should use it as a category of the sender, not that of the receiver. This concept of logical empathy opposes to the classical view of empathy studies emphasizing that empathy is a receptive category of the receiver. So, empathy is nothing else but the ability to send

emotional or intellectual content suitable to a capable receiver. Also, the comparative study in the concept of empathy in Buddhism gives us evidence that empathy is a spiritual or mental concept whose applications are in the area of pre-linguistic states and esoteric contexts. In rhetorical terms we could define it as a persuasive mood of *pathos*-driven speech.

**Keywords:** Rhetoric, empathy, apathy, sympathy, communication, speech, pathos.

## ÖZET

Bir kavram ya da terim bilimde kullanıldığında, onun çıkış noktası, işlevi ve tarihini sorarız ve kavramın, aslında bilimsel mi yoksa başka bir alandan mı geldiğini anlarız. Burada, çıkış noktasını ve işlevini belirlemek için tartışacağımız empati kavramı, böylesi bir duruma örnek teşkil etmektedir. Bu makale empatinin; bir bireyin diğerlerini, duygu ve düşüncelerini anlama yetisi olduğuna ilişkin yaygın görüşe karşı çıkmaktadır. Akademik bir kavram olarak empatiyi ve onun sınırlarını yapıçözüme uğratacağız. Bu araştırmada insan iletişimi için empati kavramı ortaya konmuştur. Kelimenin tarihini yeniden inşa ederek insanların empati olanaklarını ve kavramın antik dönemdeki başlangıcından çağdaş araştırmaya kadar uzanan anlamlarını eleştirel bir biçimde tartışacağız. Sorumuz, anlayışı olanaklı kılan bilişsel eylemler olarak empati ve diğer insanları anlamının duygusal bir yolu olarak empati arasındaki kutuplaşmaya odaklanmaktadır. Bulgularımıza dayanarak biz, empati kavramının son dönemde oluşturulmuş akademik kavram olduğunu tartışmaktayız. Bir kavram olarak empati, *apati* ve *sempati* alternatif kavramları ile örtüşmektedir. Retorikte bu, konuşmacıyı duygularla etkileyen konuşmanın *pathos*'udur. Konuşmacının özel bir alıcı yeteneğine sahip olmasına gerek yoktur. Benzer şekilde, empati kavramını kullandığımızda, alıcı olarak değil, bir gönderen kategorisi olarak kullanmalıyız. Bu mantıksal empati kavramı, empatinin, alıcının bir alımla kategorisi olduğunu vurgulayan klasik empati çalışmaları görüşüyle ters düşmektedir. Böylece empati, yetenekli bir alıcı tarafından alımlanmaya uygun duygusal ya da entelektüel içeriklerin gönderilmesi kabiliyetinden başka bir şey değildir. Ayrıca, Budizm'deki empati kavramına ilişkin karşılaştırmalı çalışma bize, empatinin ruhsal ya da akılsal bir kavram olduğunun ve uygulamalarının, dilin gelişiminden önceki dönemlerde ve ezoterik bağlamlarda bulunduğu kanıtını sunmaktadır. Retoriksel anlamda empatiyi, *pathos* odaklı konuşmanın ikna edici bir hâli olarak tanımlayabiliriz.

**Anahtar Sözcükler:** Retorik, empati, apati, sempati, iletişim, konuşma, pathos.

## STATE OF RESEARCH ON EMPATHY: THE CREATION AND APPLICATION OF A TERM

We will show in this section that the term *empathy* is a recent creation of science. It is used in the humanities and here its application comprises psychology, arts and art history, philosophy, and other areas. Research regarding this term is well documented and its history in the Western culture well known. In Dutch the term *empathie*, in French *empathie*, in German *Einfühlung* und *Empathy*, in Italian *empatia*, in Portuguese *empatia*, in Russian *соучувствие*, in Spanish *empatía*, in Swedish *empati* and *inlevelse*, in Chinese 移情作用, 神入, in Korean 감정 이입, in Japanese 感情移入, in Arabic التقمص العاطفي, الاعتناق, (الاسم), and in Hebrew הזדהות גמורה, אמפתיה. are used as expressions for empathy. Curtis drew a comprehensive historical sketch on *Einfühlung*. According to the *The Dictionary of the History of Ideas* “empathy is the idea that the vital properties which we experience in or attribute to any person or object outside ourselves are the projections of our own feelings and thoughts. The idea was first elaborated by Robert Vischer (1872) in *Das optische Formgefühl* as a psychological theory of art which asserts that because the dynamics of the formal relations in a work of art suggest muscular and emotional attitudes in a viewing subject, that subject experiences those feelings as qualities of the object. Aesthetic pleasure may thus be explained as objectified self-enjoyment in which subject and object are fused. In the social sciences a similar conception called in English “empathic understanding” refers to our deliberate attempts to identify ourselves with another, accounting for his actions by our own immediate experience of our motivations and attitudes in similar circumstances as we remember or imagine them. The English term is a translation of the German *nacherleben* as used in the works of Max Weber and Wilhelm Dilthey (cf. Maurice Natanson, *Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader*, 1963). In the *Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary*, empathy is “the imaginative projection of a subjective state into an object so that the object appears to be infused with it.” and “the action of understanding, being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of another of either the past or present without having the feelings, thoughts, and experience fully communicated in an objectively explicit manner.” In the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, empathy is “the ability to imagine oneself in another’s place and understand the other’s feelings, desires, ideas, and actions. It is a term coined in the early 20th century, equivalent to the German *Einfühlung* and

modeled on “sympathy.” The term is used with special (but not exclusive) reference to aesthetic experience. The most obvious example, perhaps, is that of the actor or singer who genuinely feels the part he is performing. With other works of art, a spectator may, by a kind of introjection, feel himself involved in what he observes or contemplates. The use of empathy is an important part of the counseling technique developed by the American psychologist Carl Rogers . Sobel (417) wrote that

empathy is a highly desirable trait in a physician, but the term means different things to different people. Rather than focus on empathy, it may be more fruitful to consider the individual ingredients of a successful patient-physician engagement: scientific competency, imagination (the basis of empathy), caring about the patient, attentive (nonjudgmental) listening to the person’s story, and skill in rewriting the illness story. The cardinal skill, on a sound base of scientific competence, is imagination. A successful engagement has beneficial consequences for physicians as well as patients.

On the website for the workshop *Varieties of Empathy in Science, Art and Culture* at the University of British Columbia was written:

The recent discovery of mirror neurons, which fire in a macaque monkey when the monkey either observes or performs a given movement, has ushered in a resurgence of interest in the meanings and mechanisms of empathy. The purported role of these neurons in empathic responses in monkeys and humans has led to an array of neuroscientific studies of cognition and autism. Empathy also plays an important role in many other disciplines: in philosophy of mind, it functions as a critical component of social cognition; in trauma studies it is a controversial means for grasping another’s experience of suffering; in ethics it has functioned as a natural or evolutionary substrate for moral behavior; and in visual studies, empathy is defined as a projective and emotion-laden engagement with aesthetic objects. In all these domains, empathy has become an indispensable tool for conceptualizing the emotional and cognitive links between self and other, and between individual minds and social and aesthetic objects.

Hoffman wrote in *Empathy Is Fickle, but Beneficial*:

Research on empathy shows that, when innocent bystanders empathize with someone in distress, even strangers, the bystanders are motivated to help- although they may not always do so. Empathy is undoubtedly a good thing; it may be the glue that holds society together. But empathy has its limitations, and one is that it is fickle. That is, we readily empathize with victims who are present or at least at the center of our attention, while forgetting quickly others from whom we have more distance.

Singer *et al.* wrote in *Sensory Components of Pain Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but not Sensory Components of Pain*:

Our ability to have an experience of another's pain is characteristic of empathy. Using functional imaging, we assessed brain activity while volunteers experienced a painful stimulus and compared it to that elicited when they observed a signal indicating that their loved one—present in the same room—was receiving a similar pain stimulus. Bilateral anterior insula (AI), rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brainstem, and cerebellum were activated when subjects received pain and also by a signal that a loved one experienced pain. (...) Thus, a neural response in AI and rostral ACC, activated in common for “self” and “other” conditions, suggests that the neural substrate for empathic experience does not involve the entire “pain matrix.” We conclude that only that part of the pain network associated with its affective qualities, but not its sensory qualities, mediates empathy.

Ferstl and fellows wrote:

The communication of stress/anxiety between conspecifics through chemosensory signals has been documented in many vertebrates and invertebrates. Here, we investigate how chemosensory anxiety signals conveyed by the sweat of humans (N=49) awaiting an academic examination are processed by the human brain, as compared to chemosensory control signals obtained from the same sweat donors in a sport condition. The chemosensory stimuli were pooled according to the donation condition and administered to 28 participants (14 males) synchronously to breathing via an olfactometer. The stimuli were perceived with a low intensity and accordingly only about half of the odor presentations were detected by the participants. The fMRI results (event-related design) show that chemosensory anxiety signals activate brain areas involved in the processing of social emotional stimuli (fusiform gyrus), and in the regulation of empathic feelings (insula, precuneus, cingulate cortex). In addition, neuronal activity within attentional (thalamus, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex) and emotional (cerebellum, vermis) control systems were observed. The chemosensory perception of human anxiety seems to automatically recruit empathy-

related resources. Even though the participants could not attentively differentiate the chemosensory stimuli, emotional contagion seems to be effectively mediated by the olfactory system.

The term communication does not cover emotional contents. On the contrary, communication is basically understood as a tool for the communication of concrete data. But also in religion the term communication is used.

No Communication

*Apathy*: State of no pathos at all

Interpersonal Communication

*Sympathy*: State of positive emotional attitude to others

Interpersonal Communication

*Empathy*: State of understanding of the thoughts and

feelings of others

### **CATEGORIES OF PATHOS**

Emotions can be communicated by expressing them to others. But they are pre-linguistic contents. The receiver has to decode them consciously or unconsciously. The categories of pathos refer to mental states that are commonly used. They derive from the medical and psychological doctrines and the etymological root of *pathos* and *contagious* in Greek are similar. So they are mental states that refer to suffering.

### **THE ROOTS OF EMPATHY IN ANCIENT GREEK CULTURE AND ITS LIMITS IN RHETORIC**

The term *πάθος* as a derivate of *παθεῖν* has the meanings anything that befalls one, an incident, accident since Herodote. Aeschines used it for that what one has suffered or one's experience. Plato used the term for suffering, misfortune, or calamity. It was by many Greek authors used to describe a state of the soul, a passion, and emotion such as love or hate. Generalized it stands for any passive state, condition, or state. For a pathetic mode of expression the expression was used by Aristotle and later on became an established category of the appeal of rhetorical speech besides *bathos* and *ethos*. The practice of *pathos* Aristotle in *πάθος ποιεῖν* expressed (*Rh.1418a12*). The Greek term *ἐμπάθεια* (*empathia*) means physical affection, passion, or partiality.

Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* (1.1.[1354a]) clearly voted against the use of *pathos* in speeches attacking the contemporary writers that emphasize the function of *pathos*. Aristotle mentions that the enthymemes are the substance of rhetoric. Essential facts are essence of rhetoric, but not emotions and personal appeal:

The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. Consequently if the rules for trials which are now laid down some states - especially in well-governed states -- were applied everywhere, such people would have nothing to say. All men, no doubt, *think* that the laws should prescribe such rules, but some, as in the court of Areopagus, give practical effect to their thoughts and forbid talk about non-essentials. This is sound law and custom. It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity -- one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it. Again, a litigant has clearly nothing to do but to show that the alleged fact is so or is not so, that it has or has not happened. As to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must surely refuse to take his instructions from the litigants: he must decide for himself all such points as the law-giver has not already defined for him.

In the second chapter (*Rhetoric* 1.2. 1356a) Aristotle mentions that persuasion comes from the hearers:

It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses. Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile.

For Aristotle persuasion derives from demonstration of evidence and ethics (*Rhetoric* 1.8. [1366a]):  
“But rhetorical evidenceted not only by demonstrative but by ethical argument; it helps a speaker to convince us, if we believe that he has certain qualities himself, namely, goodness, or goodwill

towards us, or both together.” But Aristotle also mentions the use of emotions in a speech that refer to *pathos* (Rhetoric 3.7. [1408a]):

Your language will be *appropriate* if it expresses emotion and character, and if it corresponds to its subject. "Correspondence to subject" means that we must neither speak casually about weighty matters, nor solemnly about trivial ones; nor must we add ornamental epithets to commonplace nouns, or the effect will be comic, as in the works of Cleophon, who can use phrases as absurd as "O queenly fig-tree." To express emotion, you will employ the language of anger in speaking of outrage; the language of disgust and discreet reluctance to utter a word when speaking of impiety or foulness; the language of exultation for a tale of glory, and that of humiliation for a tale of and so in all other cases. This aptness of language is one thing that makes people believe in the truth of your story: their minds draw the false conclusion that you are to be trusted from the fact that others behave as you do when things are as you describe them; and therefore they take your story to be true, whether it is so or not. Besides, an emotional speaker always makes his audience feel with him, even when there is nothing in his arguments; which is why many speakers try to overwhelm their audience by mere noise.

## **A CULTURE OF EMPATHY: GERMAN *EINFÜHLUNG* AND THE EPOQUE OF *EMPFINDSAMKEIT***

The German adjectives `einführend` and `einfühlsam` ist the equivalent to `empathizing` and `empathic`. The verb `einfühlen` means `empathize`. The époque of *Empfindsamkeit* and *Romantik* in the 18<sup>th</sup> century established in German culture history for the first time an approach to the world emphasizing the emotional access to the world. Goethe used the expression `einfühlen` in *Faust*. The verb *einfühlen* was used in the expression „ideales Streben nach Einwircken und Einfühlen in die ganze Natur“ (14,287 Faust I Plp). Wilhelm Worringer wrote the book *Abstraktion und Einfühlung* for art history. Also in German philosophy the concept of empathy is employed. Walker (247) stated that “both Jaspers and his friend and intellectual mentor, Max Weber, took phenomenology to be a part of a tradition of "empathy" (*Einfühlung*) and "understanding" (*Verstehen*). Both concepts were important within the Methodenstreit, or methodological controversy, which was raging over the nature and the scientific status of the human sciences at the turn of the century. Empathy was an important concept for Jaspers and for Weber but not for other figures within the Methodenstreit, such as Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel, both of whom were

also highly influential on Jaspers and Weber. Understanding was a crucial concept for all these men. To them, it was the defining feature of the human sciences. All of these authors and the Methodenstreit in general were dominated by themes that were fundamentally Kantian. Max Weber (1922) in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie* wrote a chapter on *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Zweiter Teil: Typen der Vergemeinschaftung und Vergesellschaftung VI. Die Wirtschaft und die Ordnungen § 2. Rechtsordnung, Konvention und Sitte. Neuordnung durch »Eingebung« und »Einfühlung«*. Körner wrote:

The ability of empathy includes different competences: being infected by emotions, the adoption of another person's perspective and the capability to understand the social context. All three competences have to be learned through social experiences. A theory of the empathic process has to describe, how it is possible to experience emotions and phantasies of another person in the self as one's own and to recognize them as belonging to the other. The theoretically founded attempt to differentiate between self-perception and the perception of the other proves necessarily to reach an impass. A constructivistic hypothesis seems to be more appropriate here, that conceives empathy as a personal draft. This draft is directed by one's own inner objects and by concrete experiences with the other as well. In the psychoanalytic dialogue both participants, patient and analyst, develop their empathic drafts and try to reach through them an understanding.

## **CONCEPTS OF EMPATHY IN SPIRITUALITY: DUKKA AND EMPATHY IN BUDDHISM**

Anderson (2009) wrote in *Empathy, Psychotherapy Integration, and Meditation: A Buddhist Contribution to the Common Factors Movement*:

Clinicians from several theoretical approaches have explored the common ground between Buddhism and Western psychotherapeutic models. In this article, the synthesis of Buddhism and psychotherapy is considered from the context of psychotherapy integration. Toward that end, the Buddhism and psychotherapy literature and the psychotherapy outcome research is reviewed with a focus on the findings of therapy equivalence and common factors among treatment approaches. Empathy and the relationship variables factor are discussed; it is argued that Buddhist meditation contains a dialectic between striving and self-acceptance. An essential aspect of meditation is seen as identical to an

essential component in therapeutic personality change. It is argued that therapist empathy and meditation promote a self-directed empathy that enhances the interdependence, integration, and cohesion of self. Several approaches to the integration of psychotherapy and Buddhist meditation are compared to the views presented here, and recommendations are offered for the clinical application of meditation training.

Goetz wrote in *Buddhist Conception of Compassion Annotated Bibliography*: "The more one reads Buddhist writings, the more one realizes that Buddhist compassion is similar to lay conceptions of compassion in name only. While lay concepts of compassion are of warm feelings for particular people in need, Buddhist compassion is not particular, warm, or even a feeling. Perhaps the most succinct and clear mention of this is in the discussions of the Dalai Lama and Jean-Claude Carriere (1996, p. 53). A footnote explains in refreshingly plain language that compassion in the Buddhist sense is not based on what we call "feeling". While Buddhist's do not deny the natural feelings that may arise from seeing another in need, this is not the compassion Buddhism values. Instead, Buddhist compassion is the result of knowing one is part of a greater whole and is interdependent and connected to that whole. It is the result of practiced meditations. Indeed, Buddhist compassion should be without heat or passion - it is objective, cold, constant and universal." Ladner in *Positive Psychology & the Buddhist Path of Compassion* for a contemporary Buddhist sect of the *Buddha Dharma Education Association* mentioned that

Western psychology has tended to focus almost exclusively on pathology. In over a hundred years of our Western psychological tradition, our greatest thinkers and researchers have focused on understanding hysteria, obsessions, psychoses, compulsions, depression, anxiety, impulsive anger, personality disorders, and the like. On the other hand, very little scientific research or theoretical thought has gone into understanding positive emotions or the psychology of human strengths and well-being. Dr. Martin Seligman, a former president of the American Psychological Association, has written about our neglect of positive psychology, reflecting that "the exclusive focus on pathology that has dominated so much of our discipline results in a model of the human being lacking the positive features that make life worth living."

Harris wrote in *Detachment and Compassion in Early Buddhism*:

Karuṅkā is the Pāli word translated as compassion. (...) In the Buddhist texts the term often refers to an attitude of mind to be radiated in meditation. This is usually considered its primary usage. Nevertheless, the definitions of Buddhist writers past and present, as well as the texts themselves, stress that it is also more than this. Anukampā and dayā, often translated as "sympathy," are closely allied to it.<sup>18</sup> In fact, at least three strands of meaning in the term "compassion" can be detected in the texts: a prerequisite for a just and harmonious society; an essential attitude for progress along the path towards wisdom (paññā); and the liberative action within society of those who have become enlightened or who are sincerely following the path towards it. All these strands need to be looked at if the term is to be understood and if those who accuse Buddhist compassion of being too passive are to be answered correctly. The foundation for any spiritual progress within Buddhism is the Five Precepts. Rites, rituals, ascetic practices, and devotional offerings are all subservient to the morality they stress. Compassion for the life, feelings, and security of others is inseparably linked with the first, second, and fourth precepts.

On Chenrezig (Avalokiteshvara) in *Embodiment of Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* was written:

In the Tibetan Buddhist pantheon of enlightened beings, Chenrezig is renowned as the embodiment of the compassion of all the Buddhas, the Bodhisattva of Compassion. Avalokiteshvara is the earthly manifestation of the self born, eternal Buddha, Amitabha. He guards this world in the interval between the historical Sakyamuni Buddha, and the next Buddha of the Future Maitreya. According to legend, Chenrezig made a a vow that he would not rest until he had liberated all the beings in all the realms of suffering. After working diligently at this task for a very long time, he looked out and realized the immense number of miserable beings yet to be saved. Seeing this, he became despondent and his head split into thousands of pieces. Amitabha Buddha put the pieces back together as a body with very many arms and many heads, so that Chenrezig could work with myriad beings all at the same time. Sometimes Chenrezig is visualized with eleven heads, and a thousand arms fanned out around him.

In the *Vimalakirti Nirdeśa Sutra* (5. The Consolation of the Invalid) is written:

Manjusri: Householder, how should a bodhisattva console another bodhisattva who is sick?

Vimalakirti: He should tell him that the body is impermanent, but should not exhort him to renunciation or disgust. He should tell him that the body is miserable, but should not encourage him to find solace in liberation; that the body is selfless, but that living beings should be developed; that the body is peaceful, but not to seek any ultimate calm. He should urge him to confess his evil deeds, but not for the sake of

absolution. He should encourage his empathy for all living beings on account of his own sickness, his remembrance of suffering experienced from beginningless time, and his consciousness of working for the welfare of living beings. He should encourage him not to be distressed, but to manifest the roots of virtue, to maintain the primal purity and the lack of craving, and thus to always strive to become the king of healers, who can cure all sicknesses. Thus should a bodhisattva console a sick bodhisattva, in such a way as to make him happy. Manjusri asked, "Noble sir, how should a sick bodhisattva control his own mind?"

In *The Great Parinirvana Sutra* (chapter 2: Cunda [611b]) was written:

At that time there was in the assembly an upasaka, a worker from Kusinagara, whose name was Cunda. He was accompanied by fifteen other such workers. In order to cause the world to attain a good effect, they discarded their majestic deportment and rose from their seats, adjusted their robes, and kneeled upon their right knees. With their palms pressed together, they felt empathy for the Buddha. Their tears flowing, they prostrated themselves at his feet and said, "Our only wish is for the World Honored One and the bhiksu sangha to mercifully accept our very last offerings in order to save the infinite number of sentient beings. World Honored One, from now on we shall be without a master, without a companion, without succor, without refuge, and without advancement. Poor, impoverished, hungry, and distressed shall we be. We hope that the Tathagata will seek another meal [1]. Our only wish is for him to mercifully accept our fine gifts before his Nirvana.

*Dukka* in Buddhism is used for permanent suffering of the human being in the world. *Nirvana* is its solution. Garrett discussed parallels between *pathos* in Greek rhetoric and Chinese rhetoric. Wallace (209) mentioned as intersubjectivity in Buddhism

“(1) the Buddhist practice of the cultivation of meditative quiescence challenges the hypothesis that individual human consciousness emerges solely from the dynamic interrelation of self and other; (2) the central Buddhist insight practice of the four applications of mindfulness is a means for gaining insight into the nature of oneself, others and the relation between oneself and the rest of the world, which provides a basis for cultivating a deep sense of empathy; (3) the Buddhist cultivation of the four immeasurables is expressly designed to arouse a rich sense of empathy with others; (4) the meditative practice of dream yoga, which illuminates the dream-like nature of waking reality is shown to have deep implications regarding the nature of intersubjectivity; (5) the theory and practice of Dzogchen, the 'great perfection' system of meditation, challenges the assertion of the existence of an inherently real, localized,

ego-centred mind, as well as the dichotomy of objective space as opposed to perceptual space.“ 遍施 (*biàn shī*) and Korean 遍施 means *universal giving*. It stands for a characteristic of the Buddha or Dharma in acting with merciful compassion toward all beings in response to their respective empathy or capacity to receive. 迹門十妙 (*jīmén shímiào*) are the ten subtle aspects of the first half of the *Lotus Sutra*. The ten subtleties of the first half of the *Lotus Sūtra* as explained in the Fahua xuanyi: subtlety of (1) objects, (2) wisdom, (3) practice, (4) stages, (5) threefold dharmas, (6) empathy and response, (7) supranormal powers, (8) preaching the dharma, (9) retinue, and (10) benefits. 本門十妙 (*běnmén shímiào*) are ten subtle aspects of the second half of the Lotus Sūtra. “The ten profound aspects of the second half of the Lotus, which expound the eternal, original Buddha: subtlety in (1) causes, (2) effects, (3) lands, (4) empathy and response, (5) supranormal powers, (6) preaching the dharma, (7) retinue, (8) nirvāṇa, (9) lifespan, and (10) benefits.”

感應道交 (*gǎnyìng dào jiāo*) means interaction of empathy and response. It is the “ interaction of the empathy or receptivity of sentient beings and the response ( 'grace' ) of a buddha or the dharma. The mutual resonance between stimulus (on the part of the practitioner] and [the Buddha Dharma's] response. 感 means to receive the saving power of the Buddha or bodhisattva, and 應 means response of the Buddha or bodhisattva to the desires of sentient beings [摩訶止觀 T 1911.46.4c14, 5a9, 12b15 ; [法華玄義 T 1716.33.646c–649c).

The Dalai Lama wrote in *Compassion. The Supreme Emotion:*

Empathy we can think of as a very honest person; reason as someone who is very practical. When the two are put together, the combination is highly effective. As such, nying-je is quite different from those random feelings like anger and lust which, far from bringing us happiness, only trouble us and destroy our peace of mind. This fact that we can enhance our feelings of concern for others is of supreme importance because the more we develop compassion, the more genuinely ethical our conduct will be. As we have seen, when we act out of concern for others, our behaviour towards them is automatically positive. This is because we have no room for suspicion when our hearts are filled with love. It is as if an inner door is opened, allowing us to reach out. Having concern for others breaks down the impediment which inhibits healthy interaction with others...

## **FINAL DISCUSSION: IS EMPATHY A SCIENTIFIC TERM? EMPATHIC SPEECH AND THE LIMITS OF EMPATHY**

Banks wrote in *A Short Handbook on Rhetorical Analysis*:

In the same way that we often like to believe that the character of the speaker shouldn't matter, we also tend to believe that we should be creatures ruled more by reason than emotion. That idea began to develop during the Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries, and given the inventions of science in the 20th century, we shouldn't be surprised that we're still encouraged to be creatures of reason".

Banks wrote:

Just as ethos is constrained by context, so too is pathos. In any analysis of the emotional impact or constraints on a particular text or situation, one must take into account the context of the situation itself. In the example above, the context is created during the stage performance. For the first monologue, we see an older Jewish man and hear his accent; we see how he is dressed and we hear how disconnected he seems to be from the dead boy, Gavin Cato. Likewise, we see the ministerial robes of the Reverend Sam and hear his contempt as he talks about how the Jews behaved. These are performance clues for the audience.

Türk presented examples of empathy in classical literature.

*Pathopoeia* as a general term for speech that moves emotionally. Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki-Moon's Speech *Remarks of the UN Secretary-General at the inauguration of the Alliance of Civilizations Forum* (Madrid, Spain, 15 January 2008) employs a *pathos* of fear of terror:

It is that difficult mission which the Alliance is rightly pursuing. So ably led by High Representative Sampaio, it has made steady progress where it counts -- on the airwaves, in the classrooms, and among the young people of today who will lead tomorrow's world.

In this way, the Alliance is playing a catalytic role, forging links with civil society, foundations, the media and business leaders. I am delighted that members of this influential network are here today -- and more importantly, that you will keep working together as a broad range of partners after we leave Madrid.

(...)

In all these ways, the efforts of the Alliance will complement the work of the United Nations to implement the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted by the General Assembly in 2006. They will also bolster our endeavours in preventive diplomacy, and in supporting sustainable peace processes. No matter how many resolutions we adopt, envoys we dispatch, or peace agreements we negotiate, their prospects of success will be fragile if the parties do not have a real and profound sense of our shared humanity.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Fostering dialogue will not produce change overnight. It is not the fast way. But it is the sure way. It is the enduring way. The careful plans of the Alliance – of you, our partners – will deliver in the long run.

Let us use this Forum to advance the momentum. When we depart, let us build on it with all our vigour.

The threats are terrifying. But the responses are at hand.

Thank you very much.

(Ki-Moon)

John F. Kennedy's speech delivered 26<sup>th</sup> of June 1963 in West Berlin with the statement *Ich bin ein Berliner* ("I am a 'Berliner'") employs at the utmost possible level empathy identifying the speaker with the audience. The reference to the *Imperium Romanum* stating that the proudest boast was "civis Romanus sum." Kennedy turned "today, in the world of freedom" to the expression "the proudest boast is "Ich bin ein Berliner." The speech was a speech distinguishing between "the free world" and "the Communist world". Aristotle mentioned in the *Rhetoric* (1.1. [1354b]) that

political oratory is less given to unscrupulous practices than forensic, because it treats of wider issues. In a political debate the man who is forming a judgment is making a decision about his own vital interests. There is no need, therefore, to prove anything except that the facts are what the supporter of a measure maintains they are. In forensic oratory this is not enough; to conciliate the listener is what pays here. It is other people's affairs that are to be decided, so that the judges, intent on their own satisfaction and listening with partiality, surrender themselves to the disputants instead of judging between them.

Most definitions of empathy rely on the concept of sharing emotions and thinking of others by a specific capability, empathy. It is commonly understood as a quality of the person who receives the

information from another person. According to behavior science the sharing of emotions with others starts at an early childhood age. We argue that when humans are capable to read or speak about emotions and thoughts of others, they employ rhetorical concepts of descriptions and articulate themselves in words. Empathy manifested as expressions of utterances lacks self-evidence. Self-evidence is a necessity for persuasion according to Aristotle who wrote in the *Rhetoric* (1.2. [1356b]): “A statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly self-evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements that are so.” Empathy is not based on facts. So it is not persuasive. In *On the Problem of Empathy* Edith Stein already critically discussed empathy in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Waddell discussed *pathos* in science. For us empathy is actually not a scientific term, it is a description of a mental state and finds its equivalents in spiritual concepts in other cultures. Empathy is used for a spiritual or mental concept. As such a spiritual or mental concept, it was in many cultures applied. The term found its way into science through the literature of various cultures. It entails a specific mental attitude in human communication. We argue that it is impossible to understand the emotions and thought of other persons based upon empathy; instead of this, logical reasoning and analogies from own experiences allow us to understand others. Empathy combines reception of persuasive speech or behavior and similar experiences of the receiver of empathy. Empathy is only possible when the object of empathy is actually the subject of empathy: No one will understand the thoughts and emotions of a person sitting in a room next door; only communicated knowledge about the person will allow another person to understand thinking or emotions. Here we have a description as access to record emotions and we have seen that Aristotle was the first one to discuss critically the limits of emotions. While we saw that empathy is a term of humanities and has similar concepts in cultural areas such as art, literature, and religion/spirituality, we must emphasize that the general framework of empathy and its *locus genii* is the persuasive linguistic framework.

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